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This short dissertation briefly examines the English 
law statutory provisions and the English judicial 
approach relating to the clean break principle. A 
comparison between English law and South African 
law (in particular s 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979) 
shows the latter to allow the application of the clean 
break principle, but rigidity in the legislative wording 
and further rigidity in the wording by the courts result 
in the clean break principle not being a dominant 
feature of South African divorce law. A detailed 
analysis of South African case law follows in which 
the fundamental issues relative to the clean break 
principle are examined, namely the one third rule, 
universal partnership, misconduct and its effect on 
court orders, the nature of a contribution and what 
property is distributed on divorce. Trends in 
maintenance orders are looked at and how these 
affect the clean break principle, in particular 
rehabilitative maintenance and token maintenance 
wards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The clean break principle advocates the division of the assets of spouses on 
divorce so that both spouses attain financial independence, neither spouse is 
responsible for the ongoing maintenance of the other and all financial ties 
between the spouses are severed on divorce. 
The concept of the clean break is one further acknowledgement by the law of 
the shifting societal perspective of marriage and divorce. Social policy has 
moved our law from fault to failure as grounds for divorce; from maintenance 
awards based on innocence in relation to breakdown, to maintenance awards 
based on need; from division of assets based on ownership, to division of 
assets based on diverse criteria of which ownership is not the overriding 
criterion and where notions of justice and equity are taken into consideration. 
Social policy has also demanded recognition of greater gender equality, and 
the law has responded in the sphere of marriage law by abolishing the marital 
~\ power which a husband had over a wife (1l and by making spouses in 
community of property joint administrators of the joint estate.(2l Spouses are 
now joint guardians of their minor children (3l and the wife can acquire a 
domicile of choice during the marriage.(4l In the sphere of divorce, the courts 
have become cognisant of the aim of financial independence of the parties on 
divorce when making awards for the redistribution of assets. The clean break 
is the most effective tool the courts have at their disposal to implement 
financial independence of the parties. 
However, one has to acknowledge firstly, that reality often lags behind social 
policy and secondly, that the clean break concept works best in an ideal 
society - where husbands and wives have equal opportunities within the 
marriage and outside it to establish economic independence; where child-
rearing and running of the home are joint tasks with equal time and effort 
required of both spouses. 
(1 l S 11 (1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
(2) S 14 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
(3) S 1 (1) of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993. 
(4) S 1 (1) of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992. 
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,_Reality presents itself in a different way. By and large wives become 
financially dependent on their husbands in a marriage, and that factual reality 
creates the greatest difficulty on divorce, for one cannot at the time of divorce 
impose a philosophy of liberty, justice and equality when such a philosophy 
did not exist up to that point. Furthermore, it cannot be expected of divorce 
legislation to provide solutions to life's inequalities. Yet many situations do 
arise where implementation of a clean break is possible and optional. This 
paper will examine: 
(i) whether a clean break principle is capable of application in South 
African law in the light of the legislative wording of s 7 of the Divorce 
Act 70 of 1979; 
(ii) the South African judicial attitude to the clean break principle. 
As a starting point, it would be a worthwhile exercise to compare briefly the 
wording and intent of the English law and the South African law in relation to 
this issue.11i 
THE ENGLISH LAW 
1 . STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 deals with maintenance and 
• property adjustment orders on divorce. The reason for the enactment 
of the relevant sections, and therefore the aim of such provisions, is 
stated in s 21 ( 1) in connection with financial provision (maintenance) 
orders and in s 21 (2) in connection with property adjustment orders as 
being "for the purpose of adjusting the financial position of the parties 
to a marriage and any children of the family ... " 
( 1) It is not the intention of this paper to focus on English Law and hence the discussion on English Law is not 
comprehensive. 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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S 23( 1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 empowers the court, on 
granting, inter alia, a decree of divorce, or thereafter, to order periodical 
payments from one spouse to another for such term as may be 
specified in the order 111 or to order one or more lump sum payments as 
may be specified to be made from one spouse to another.121 The lump 
sum payments are designed, inter alia, to settle debts which a spouse 
reasonably incurred to maintain himself /herself or any child of the family 
prior to making application for maintenance.131 Periodical 141 and lump 
sum payments 151 can also be ordered for the benefit of a child (under 
18 years) of a marriage to be paid to a specified person or to the child. 
S 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 empowers a court on 
granting, inter alia, a decree of divorce, or thereafter, to make an order 
obliging one spouse to transfer to, inter alia, the other spouse such 
property as may be specified.t6l The court is also empowered to order 
that property be transferred to its satisfaction 111 and to vary any 
antenuptial or post-nuptial settlement for the benefit of the spouses or 
children or any of them or to extinguish or reduce the interest of a party 
under such settlement.(81 
The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1 984 introduced several 
amendments to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It is instructive to 
examine those amendments firstly for what they introduce and 
secondly for what they replace. The most noteworthy change is the 
enactment in s 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1 973 of an 
obligation on a court, when exercising its discretionary powers in 
relation to maintenance (of a spouse) or property adjustment orders, 
(between spouses) to consider whether it would be appropriate to apply 
a clean break. 
S 23(1 )(a). (6) S 24(1)(a). 
S 23(1 )(c). (7) s 24(1 )(b). 
S 23(3)(a). (8) S 24(1)(c). 
s 23(1 )(d). 
s 23(1 )(f). 
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Subsection ( 1) requires ["it shall be the duty"] a court to consider 
whether it would be appropriate to exercise its powers so that the 
financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated 
as soon after the grant of the decree as the court considers just and 
reasonable. 
Subsection (2) requires ["shall"] a court when ordering periodical 
payments, secured or unsecured, to consider whether it would be 
appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for 
such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable 
the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue 
hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the 
other party. 
Subsection (3) allows ["may"] a court to dismiss an application for 
periodical payments if it considers that no continuing obligation should 
be imposed on a party to make or secure such payments in favour of 
the other party. 
Section 25( 1) compels the court when making both maintenance and 
property adjustment orders to take into account all circumstances of 
the case (giving priority to welfare of children under eighteen) including 
certain factors specified in s 25(2) and s 25(3). These include 
resources, obligations, age, duration of marriage and standard of living 
during marriage and also include as further factors: 
"the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources 
which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the 
foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity, any 
increase in that capacity which would in the opinion of the court be 
reasonable to expect a party to a marriage to acquire." 111 
"the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the 
foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any 
contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family ";121 
(1) S 3 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (introducing s 25 (2)(a) ). 
(2) S 3 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (introducing s 25 (2)(f) ) . 
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The underlined portions were introduced by the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1 984, which also introduced the following three 
subsections. 
S 28( 1 A) states that "(W)here a periodical payments or secured 
periodical payments order in favour of a party to a marriage is made on 
or after the grant of a decree of divorce ... , the court may direct that 
that party shall not be entitled under section 31 below for the extension 
of the term specified in the order".111 
S 31 (7) states that "(J)n exercising the powers conferred by this 
section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child 
of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen, and the 
circumstances of the case shall include any change in any of the 
matters to which the court was required to have regard when making 
the order to which the application relates, and-
(a) in the case of a periodical payments or secured 
periodical payments order made on or after the grant 
of a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage, the 
court shall consider whether in all the circumstances 
and after having regard to any such change it would 
be appropriate to vary the order so that payments 
under the order are required to be made or secured 
only for such further period as will in the opinion of 
the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose 
favour the order was made to adjust without undue 
hardship to the termination of those payments; 
(b) -" (2) 
(1 l Introduced bys 5(2) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. 
(2) Introduced by s 6(3) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. 
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S 31 { 1 0) states that "(W)here the court, in exercise of its powers 
under this section, decides to vary or discharge a periodical payments 
or secured periodical payments order, then, subject to section 28(1) 
and (2) above, the court shall have power to direct that the variation or 
discharge shall not take effect until the expiration of such period as 
may be specified in the order." (1l 
2. GENERAL COMMENTS 
Clearly the English legislature has considered the clean break concept 
sufficiently feasible to embody it in an enactment. The amending 
provisions and insertions have an overriding focus on termination of 
financial dependence of the spouses and adjustment to financial 
independence. The approach of the legislature is broad, holistic and 
realistic. The relevant provisions empower the court to effect a clean 
break between the parties, even in situations where they themselves 
agree otherwise. 
The concepts of "just and reasonable", "without undue hardship", 
"reasonable to expect" and "likely" prevent a court from taking an 
unrealistic view of a divorced spouse's {usually wife's) ability to 
support herself. Each case is decided on its merits and is based on its 
own particular circumstances, as will be seen from the short discussion 
on the case law which follows. 
The amendment to s 25( 1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act and the 
introduction of s 25{A) replace a previously unworkable and impractical 
directive to place the parties, as far as was practicable and just, in the 
financial position they would have been in if the marriage had not 
broken down and each party had properly discharged his or her 
financial obligations and responsibilities to the other.(2l 
( 1) Introduced by s 6(4) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. 
(2) Repealed s 25 ( 1). 
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In summary, the court has the power to effect a clean break at various stages, 
during and after divorce proceedings. At the outset, the court is obliged to 
consider the appropriateness of a clean break. If it decides against a clean 
break, it can order periodical payments for a specified period (which may be 
extended). This imposes a clean break at the time of divorce but to take 
effect at some time later, thus delaying the implementation of the clean break. 
The court can also at the time of making an order for periodical payments 
order that no application for extension of the period specified for the periodical 
payments be allowed. The period then becomes immutably fixed, and the 
exact time of the implementation of the clean break is set. In considering 
whether to impose periodical payments for a specified period only, and even 
more so, to prohibit extension of that period, the court would base its decision 
largely on the reasonable expectation of the payee spouse to an increase in 
earning capacity. The introduction of the latter consideration into the 
legislation means, in my opinion, that the court is more likely to impose a 
clean break, as the court can consider not only the prevailing situation at the 
time of divorce, (which may well not permit an immediate or deferred clean 
break) but also reasonably expected future circumstances, which may allow a 
future clean break. 
The legislation recognises the clean break concept as a broad category of 
relief, applicable at varying stages and in varying degrees. There can be a 
complete clean break with an order for division of assets and no periodical 
payments or entitlements under any other legislation; there can be an order 
for division of assets and no periodical payments but claims in terms of other 
legislation remain intact; there can be a lump sum payment in lieu of or in 
addition to a capital transfer with no periodical payments; there can be a 
dismissal of an application for periodical payments with or without a capital 
transfer; there can be periodical payments {secured, unsecured, or as lump 
sum instalments) for a specified but extendable period; there can be periodical 
payments for a fixed and unchangeable period; there can be a limitation placed 
on the time period applicable to further payment of periodical payments in a 
application for variation of such order; there may even be a discharge of a 
periodical payment order when application is made for its variation; there can 
be an order directing that a discharge may not take place until a specified 
period has elapsed. All of the above variables appear from the legislative 
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provisions quoted above. The wording of the English legislation provides the 
courts with the tools to effect a clean break whenever possible. 
3. THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS 
The English courts have been cautious but willing to apply a clean 
break. Each case is decided on its own merits and there are no definite 
guidelines to extract, other than common sense principles. Cretney 111 
identifies three categories as illustrative of the attitude of the courts. 
Where the spouses are (or one of them is) wealthy, the application of 
the clean break is not difficult. Where periodical payments will not 
benefit the other spouse, a clean break will be ordered. The broad band 
of cases between the above two categories, he feels, are more difficult 
to categorise, but generally a clean break will be applied where the only 
real asset of value is the family home and the only real source of 
income is that of one of the spouses. The courts' inclination is to 
award the family home to the wife and to dismiss her claim for 
periodical payments. This was for example achieved in Livesey 
(formerly Jenkins) v Jenkins 12) 
The attitude of the courts has been to ensure that no undue hardship 
results in applying a clean break. An offer by the husband in Boylan v 
Boylan (3) to pay a particular lump sum in substitution of periodical 
payments (on application for variation of those payments by the wife 
following a large capital gain by the husband), was rejected by the 
court as insufficient. What is interesting about this case is that the 
court accepted in principle the substitution of a lump sum payment for 
periodic payments by agreement of the parties, notwithstanding that 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 expressly provides that lump sum or 
capital provisions shall not be made on applications to vary periodical 
awards. 141 
(1) Cretney, S.M. and Masson, J.M. Principles of Family Law 5ed (1990) 413-415. 
(2) [1985) F.L.R. 813 (HL) The House of Lords set the order aside on the grounds of the wife's failure to 
disclose her impending remarriage. 
(3) [1988) 1 F.L.R. 282. 
(4) S 31 (5) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
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A willingness to implement a clean break is evident. A similar attitude was 
displayed in S v S, 11 l a case preceding Boylan 12) which was accepted as 
correct in Boylan. 
It is hoped that the South African courts will not seek guidance from the 
decision of Suter v Suter and Jones. (3) Whilst the court did dismiss the notion 
that the fact of dependent children prevented a clean break from being 
applied, it did order token maintenance in the form of one pound a year. The 
judge felt it was "premature to make an order terminating the wife's claim for 
periodical payments ... " (4) and thus negated the clean break. In Whiting v 
Whiting, (5) an appeal against a decision not to discharge the husband's 
obligation to make periodical payments to his wife, the appeal court took the 
view that it was not obliged to discharge the order based on the clean break 
principle, but could keep the obligation intact by ordering nominal payments 
which could be increased upon the occurrence of unforeseen events. Slade LJ 
stated "I find myself unable to say that the judge was obviously wrong in taking the 
view that, on the particular facts of this case, the maintenance order should be kept alive 
as a 'last backstop'. " (6) It is some comfort that all the judges felt that a clean 
break was applicable but that the trial judge had not been manifestly wrong in 
her decision and hence it could not be overturned. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
1 . STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
S 7(2) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides the court with a 
discretion to order one spouse to pay maintenance to the other after 
divorce, in the absence of an agreement between the parties. The 
court, in exercising that discretion must have regard to: 
[1987] 1 F.L.R. 71. 
[1988] 1 F.L.R. 282. 
[1987] 2 All ER 336 (CA). 
At 16 a. 
[1988] 2 All ER 275 (CA). 
At 287 d. 
the existing or prospective means of each of the parties; 
their respective earning capacities; 
their financial needs and obligations; 
the age of each of the parties; 
the duration of the marriage; 
the standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce; 
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their conduct insofar as it may be relevant to the breakdown of 
the marriage; 
an order in terms of ss 3; 
and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should 
be taken into account. 
Taking the above factors into account, the court may make an order which it 
finds just, to endure for any period until the death or remarriage of the party in 
whose favour the order is given. 
S 7(3) empowers the court to transfer assets from one party to another, in the 
absence of an agreement between them, provided that the parties were 
married before 1 November 1 984 by antenuptial contract excluding community 
of property, community of profit and loss and accrual sharing. In respect of 
people married in terms of s 22(6) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
such marriages were automatically out of community of property without an 
antenuptial contract being entered into. Thus s 7(3) did not apply to such 
marriages until 1988 with the enactment of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 which now makes the provisions of 
the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1 984 applicable to such marriages. 
Transfers in terms of s 7(3) must be deemed just and equitable in the eyes of 
the court and cannot be ordered by the court unless one party has made 
application therefor. 
S 7(4) prohibits the court from making an order in terms of s 7(3) unless the 
court is satisfied that it is equitable and just by reason of the estate of the 
spouse against whom the order is given having been maintained or increased 
during the marriage by the contributions, direct or indirect, of the other 
spouse, either by rendering of services or saving of expenses which would 
otherwise have been incurred, or in any other manner. 
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S 7(5) obliges the court, aside from the contributions referred to in s 7(4), also 
to take into account: 
the existing means and obligations of the parties; 
any donations by one to the other during the marriage or which is 
owing and enforceable in terms of their antenuptial contract; 
any order in terms of s 9 or other law which affects the patrimonial 
position of the parties; 
any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account. 
S 7(6) allows deferment of an order under s 7(3). 
2. COMPARISON WITH ENGLISH LAW 
Viewing the above sections against the objective of implementing a 
clean break, and in comparison to the English legislation, the following 
comments are pertinent: 
i) the first and most obvious observation is that there is no 
mention in the South African legislation of a clean break as a 
possible objective - it is neither an overriding consideration nor 
even a stated option. In comparison, ss 1 of s 25A of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 makes the court duty-bound to 
consider whether it would be appropriate to exercise its powers 
to effect a clean break between the spouses. The English court 
is not bound to rum..!Y a clean break but rather to consider the 
aptness of a clean break in every case before it. The South 
African court gets no direction from the legislation even to 
consider a clean break as a possible solution. When a South 
African court does make an order of that nature, it relies on its 
inherent jurisdiction to do so; 
ii) in both English and South African law the court is empowered 
to make maintenance orders in favour of one of the spouses. 
English law incorporates the notion of a clean break even in 
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orders of this kind, making it peremptory for the court to 
consider whether it would be appropriate to make such 
payments of limited duration. The South African provisions 
contain no such equivalent direction to the court obliging it to 
consider maintenance payments of limited duration. The court, 
however, is empowered, if it so wishes, to make such orders in 
terms of the wording of s 7(2);(1) 
iii) the English court can order lump sum payments from one 
spouse to another for the purposes of maintenance or to off-set 
debt already incurred in maintaining the family. Thus 
potentially maintenance can be dealt with on a once-off basis. 
This order can be made before or after the decree of divorce. 
South African law does not recognise a lump sum payment as 
a maintenance award. All maintenance awards are by way of 
periodic payments and thus of an ongoing nature, whether 
temporary or permanent; 
iv) lump sum payments and property transfers have a much 
broader ambit in English law. They can be made to the spouse, 
to the children of the marriage or to specified people for the 
benefit of the children. The South African legislation does not, 
in these provisions, look at the family as a unit. The order it 
makes is between the spouses. The court is not in any way 
directed to consider the possibility of catering for the children's 
needs by way of lump sum payments (to a trust for example). 
South African law requires maintenance for children to be paid 
to the other spouse (unless the parties agree otherwise);(21 
(1) "for any period". 
(2) Joffe v Lubner 1972 (4) SA 521 (C). 
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v) in English law the criteria for deciding both property and 
maintenance orders are the same. The English court has a 
more holistic approach to its order. The South African law, in 
contrast, has, in terms of the legislative wording, two separate 
and different enquiries in regard to maintenance and 
redistribution orders, utilising different criteria for each. On the 
plain wording of the provisions, s 7(2) takes cognisance of s 
7(3) but not vice versa (11. The criteria of s 7(2) by and large 
look to the present and the future, and encompass elements of 
need. The criteria of s 7(5) look to the present and the past. 
The relevant factors in s 7(3) are firmly embedded in the past; 
vi) in English law, the future increase in earning capacity of a 
spouse, not as a certainty but as a reasonable expectation, is 
considered when making both maintenance and property 
awards. This places the onus on a spouse to take steps to 
earn an income or increase that income after divorce, and 
should he/she not do so when it could reasonably be expected 
of him/her to do so, the consequences will be his/hers to bear. 
The responsibility for maintenance thus firstly falls on that 
person, requiring him/her to gain financial independence. In 
South African law whether a spouse should find empJoyment is 
left to the discretion of the court to weigh up in the 
circumstances of the case. The South African courts are 
directed to look at the parties' earning capacities. Traditionally 
the courts have interpreted this to mean present and future, but 
on the wording, would not necessarily be obliged to include 
future earning capacities. The South African courts are also 
directed to look at existing or prospective means. This implies 
income from sources other than their own earning capacities, 
and, in my opinion, "prospective" would need to be almost a 
certainty to be taken into account; 
(2) This will be more fully discussed later. 
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vii) in English law the contributions of the spouses to be 
considered are not necessarily to the other's estate but to the 
welfare of the family as a whole, both past and future. The 
use of the concept 'welfare' takes the contribution out of the 
realms of 'financial' contribution or even the necessity to 
provide a financial quantification, or even to link it to any 
financial consequence. The wording expressly includes as a 
contribution the looking after the home or caring for the family. 
It also includes contributions not yet made but are likely in the 
foreseeable future to be made. In South African law the 
wording is narrowly couched so that contributions are those 
made only to the other spouse's estate. The meaning of the 
word contribution has been a source of judicial debate, 
especially on the very issue of whether it would include looking 
after the home and caring for the family over and above 
common law duties in this regard; 111 
viii) in English law the contribution of a spouse is not a sine qua 
non to the transfer of assets or maintenance orders, nor is it 
more weighted than any of the other factors. Thus, if there 
has been no contribution by one spouse, an order can still be 
granted should the other factors exist - the court is obliged to 
take all the circumstances into account. In South African law 
without a contribution by one spouse to the other's estate 
within the meaning of the legislative provisions, ie maintaining 
or increasing the others spouses estate, there can be no 
transfer of assets. The wording does not permit any exception; 
(ix) in English law the court is empowered to effect a clean break 
on application to vary periodical payments by terminating the 
period for which the periodical payments are to continue. In 
South African law the court has no such power and can only 
vary the amount payable and thus has no opportunity to effect 
a clean break in any situation, other than at the divorce hearing 
itself. 
( 1) See discussion later. 
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3. THE LEGISLATIVE WORDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS - SOME 
OBSERVATIONS 
It is the last mentioned point which, in my view, militates most strongly 
against application of a clean break between the parties. A wife who 
wishes to have a redistribution order in her favour must have 
contributed to the maintenance or increase of her husband's estate 
during the marriage in such form and in such manner as will be 
regarded by the court to have been a contribution in terms of that 
subsection, and then has to discharge the onus of proving her 
contribution in evidence at the hearing of the divorce. 
The problems involved are manifold. The divorce trial becomes a 
detailed delving into the past. If the court finds that the wife has 
contributed sufficiently to her husband's estate, to comply with the 
legislative requirements, then she is granted some of his assets. The 
application of this subsection becomes a system of reward, and the 
wife's future financial stability is based on her past activities. No 
enquiry is addressed as to her needs. 
The downfall of the application of s 7(3) is clear. I cite below various 
instances that have occurred in my own practice as an attorney, which 
are illustrative of the practical difficulties of implementing s 7(3) with a 
clean break in mind. In one case there was a marriage of long duration 
where the husband amassed enormous wealth, the parties lived 
luxuriously, the wife did not work as there was no need for her to do so 
and she consequently had no income or assets of her own. She also 
did little within the household and nothing in regard to assisting her 
husband in increasing or maintaining his wealth. On divorce, the wife 
could not rely on s 7(3) and had no option but to proceed under s 7(2). 
In this case a clean break was not a legislative imperative where the 
circumstances would ideally have suited it. 
The court has no legislative directive to impose or to consider imposing 
a clean break. It may well do so, but arising from its inherent 
jurisdiction and common sense. 
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Take another example. Both spouses worked during the marriage and 
had independent incomes, the wife was sickly and ran up enormous 
medical bills which her income was insufficient to cover. Her husband 
thus paid for them. On dissolution of the marriage, the wife had in fact 
depleted her husband's estate. She was thus not entitled to a s 7(3) 
award. Had the facts been slightly different and she had no income of 
her own at all because ill health prevented her from working or from 
running the household without great assistance, there too a s 7(3) 
claim would have been denied to her. In both scenarios, the wife has 
to rely on s 7(2). Another situation which has occurred in my practice 
in a similar vein was where a wife spent excessively, and not only did 
not add to or maintain her husband's estate, but quite substantially 
depleted it. The matter is still to be decided by the court, but we have 
been instructed to plead (on behalf of the husband) that the wife is not 
entitled to an order in terms of s 7(3) and is entitled to maintenance 
only. On the facts, however, the husband can afford to provide the 
wife with sufficient assets to avoid a maintenance claim. The husband 
refuses to provide her with assets and relies on the legislation for his 
instructions. Were the court obliged to consider a clean break, and 
were the wife's past activities not the sole reason for distributing 
assets, our client's pleadings would of necessity be different and the 
wife would have been free to require a clean break. 
Take one further example from my practice, a wife has worked all her 
life, run the household, brought up the children, contributed to her 
husband's estate in the manner required by s 7(3) but the husband's 
estate has not increased at the date of divorce as he has handled his 
affairs imprudently. Again, s 7(2) is all that is left to the wife.(1J 
All of the above is further exacerbated by the narrow meaning the 
courts have placed on the word 'contribution' in the context of s 7(3), 
as well as the limitations placed on property which is transferable.121 
( 1) Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 51 - 52. 
(2) This will be discussed later. 
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As s 7(3) is now structured, the application of the clean break principle 
strains to be implemented. If one looks at the motivation for enacting 
s 7(3), the reason for its failure to incorporate the clean break principle 
becomes evident. The motivation behind the enactment was to redress 
past financial disparity that resulted when spouses, married out of 
community of property and thus having separate ownership of assets 
left the marriage with only their own assets. This often created 
enormous financial hardship. The enactment was also an attempt to 
grant acknowledgement in law, and hence financial recognition, to the 
contributions which both spouses made to the marriage, however 
differently those contributions were made. Thus essentially s 7(3) was 
seen as a remedy for a particular ill. It was not intended to address 
other issues like aiming for financial independence of the spouses on 
divorce. The provisions thus do not address that issue. The English 
law provisions, in contrast, do just that. Their aim is to adjust the 
financial positions of the parties with a view to financial independence. 
Ironically, there are aspects in s 7(2) which allow a clean break 
interpretation. That subsection provides that the court has to have 
regard to the existing or prospective means of each of the parties. This 
would include for example the likelihood to enjoy greater earnings, a 
future capital acquisition and possibly even the capacity to earn more. 
Taking prospective means as a factor in assessing maintenance needs, 
maintenance for a specified period can be ordered and indeed has been 
so ordered. The court is entitled to grant maintenance 'for any period' 
until death or remarriage of the recipient spouse. 'For any period' 
means a period of any length, decided in the light of the particular 
circumstances, up to a definite cut-off time. Thus, s 7(2) clearly 
permits the court to make maintenance awards for a specified length of 
time for rehabilitative purposes, ie. to allow a person who has perhaps 
been out of the job market for some years to requalify, to seek 
employment, to re-adjust and plan for a new financial situation.111 
( 1) This will be discussed more fully later. 
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S7(2) requires the court to consider an order in terms of s 7(3). S7(3) 
does not have a reciprocal provision. Any attempt to regard that as an 
oblique suggestion by the legislature to consider a redistribution of 
assets first and thereafter a maintenance order (if the redistribution 
were insufficient to do justice in the particular circumstances) has been 
firmly rejected both by the dicta and practice of the courts. Both 
Kriegler J, in the court a quo, and Botha JA, in the appeal court, of the 
Beaumont ( 1 ) matter took both sections into consideration 
simultaneously. The interrelationship between s7(2) and s7(3) was 
expressly accepted by the Appellate Division. As its highest point, the 
lack of reference to s7(2) in s7(4) (which sets out the relevant factors 
for application of s7(3)) can be regarded as an opening to the courts to 
apply their discretion in favour of a redistribution and, if circumstances 
permit, to go no further.111 
4. MARRIAGES NOT SUBJECT TO SECTION 7(3) 
It is not only in respect of marriages out of community of property and 
to which s 7(3) applies that a clean break can .result. It is possible, in 
certain circumstances, to effect a clean break in respect of marriages in 
community of property and marriages subject to the accrual system. 
The possibility arises if the factual circumstances permit, not by virtue 
of any legislation or powers of the court. 
Community of property, by its very nature, means that each spouse 
owns an undivided half-share in the community estate. This is so 
during the marriage and on divorce. Thus by virtue of ownership each 
spouse retains 50% of the community estate on divorce. If neither 
spouse can afford to maintain the other, or neither spouse needs 
maintenance from the other, the court will order that no maintenance is 
payable and a clean break will be effected. However, the court is not 
empowered by any legislation to order that one spouse, who requires 
maintenance, should acquire more than 50% of the community estate 
in lieu of maintenance. 
(1) 1987(1)SA967(A). 
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In a situation where one spouse has little or no earning capacity and the 
other can earn well and acquire assets thereby, the court cannot rely on 
any legislative provision to order that the spouse with lesser ability to 
earn retains more than 50% of the community estate and the other 
spouse pays no maintenance, simply in order to effect a clean break. 
The court would be entitled to make such an order in terms of the 
provisions of s 9 of the Divorce Act which would entitle one spouse to 
be awarded more than 50% of the community estate arising from the 
other spouse's conduct and depending upon that spouse's contribution 
/to the assets of the marriage. Forfeiture can only apply to that portion 
of the estate which one spouse benefits by virtue of the marriage in 
community of property, and not to the assets which that spouse 
contributed towards the common estate if that contribution exceeds 
50%. But in that situation ie forfeiture, other facts and circumstances 
unrelated to the aim of achieving a clean break would give rise to an 
uneven division of the community estate. A similar situation prevails in 
respect of marriages subject to the accrual system. In the absence of a 
forfeiture order under s 9, the court has no power to order an accrual 
sharing different from what the parties had contracted in their 
antenuptial contract. In circumstances where the accrual division is 
sufficient to allow each spouse to live off his/her own means, coupled 
with his/her earning capacity, a clean break would be effected, but not 
as a result of legislative provisions or judicial powers, but as a result of 
the circumstances of the case. The result achieved is a clean break but 
that clean break is a by-product of other legislative provisions and not 
an aim or judicial power in itself. 
One final observation should be made in relation to s 7. The only basis 
on which our courts can apply a clean break is to use s 7(3) as the 
launching pad and to disregard s 7(2). Aside from marriages entered 
into in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, s 7 applies only to 
marriages entered into prior to 1 November 1 984 out of community of 
property, profit and loss, excluding any accrual sharing and by 
antenuptial contract. Marriages after that date or which precede that 
date but have one of the excluded features do not fall within s 7. Thus 
in divorces where ideal circumstances prevail to apply a clean break 
Page 22 
policy, but the marriage was not one provided for in s 7, the court is 
not empowered in any way to effect a redistribution of assets and 
thereby, a clean break. 
5. THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS - AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW 
Recognition of the clean break principle 
In the light of the legislature having elected not to direct the courts to 
apply a clean break between divorcing parties, the courts have, not 
surprisingly, been conservative in their approach to do so. However, 
the clean break principle has been expressly recognised by the 
Appellate Division in Beaumont v Beaumont.(1) 
After discussing the amendment to the (English) Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 Botha JA stated: "In terms of s 25A it is now the duty of the 
English courts to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise their 
powers that the financial obligations of each party to the other will be 
terminated as soon after the grant of the decree of divorce as the Court 
considers just and reasonable... In other words, the English legislation now 
seeks to foster the imposition of a 'clean break' in appropriate circumstances. "!2l 
He continued that: "Our legislation contains no corresponding provision, but 
in this instance I do not consider the concept underlying it to be foreign to our 
law. On the contrary, there is no doubt in my mind that our courts will always 
bear in mind the possibility of using their powers under the new dispensation in 
such a way as to achieve a complete termination of the financial dependence of 
the one party on the other, if the circumstances permit. The last-mentioned 
qualification is, of course, very important ... "!3l 
(1) 1987(1)SA967(A). 
(2) At 992 I. 
(3) At 993 A • B. 
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Judge Botha' s words can be seen as a definite endorsement of the 
applicability of the clean break principle in our law, even though the 
endorsement is couched in the form of a personal view and is not a statement 
of principle, and even though the endorsement is limited to "in this instance" 
{presumably to applications for redistribution orders as opposed to marriages in 
community of property or subject to the accrual regime). In essence, he felt 
that, notwithstanding the lack of legislation on the issue, judges will, in his 
view, adopt the approach the English judges are obliged to adopt ie. to 
consider the possibility of a clean break. In the case of South African judges, 
they will consider using their discretionary powers, granted by the legislation, 
to apply a clean break. His caution that such principle would only be 
appropriate if the circumstances permit is justifiable as naturally not every 
situation can uniformly have a clean break applied to it. As will be seen later, 
the judges have been cautious and conservative in identifying appropriate 
circumstances. Thus Judge Botha' s confidence and optimism that the courts 
will always consider applying a clean break approach has not been borne out 
in practice. 
Botha JA then went on to explain how the clean break principle is to be fitted 
into the constraints of s 7(2) and s 7(3). He stated: "The manner of achieving 
such a result is, of course, by making only a redistribution order in terms of ss(3) and 
no maintenance order in terms of ss(2). What I have said earlier with regard to the 
Court taking an overall view, from the outset, of the possibility of making an order or 
orders under either ss(2) or ss(3) or both, does not mean that the court will not consider 
specifically the desirability in any case of making only a redistribution order and 
awarding no maintenance, having regard particularly to the feasibility of following such 
a course. "(1) 
Beaumont v Beaumont !2l was the very first reported case after the 
introduction of s 7 (3) - (6) of the Divorce Act and, in a sense, it set the tone 
for the cases that followed. Accordingly, the dicta of Kriegler J are worth 
examining as a foundation for several issues in relation to the clean break 
principle and as a basis to compare the dicta of other cases that preceded and 
followed. 
(1) At993C-D. 
(2) 1985 (4) SA 171 (W). 
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The One Third Rule 
The one third rule was enunciated in the English case of Wachtel v Wachtel. 111 
It was used by the English courts as a starting point to assess the parties' 
respective income and capital distribution on divorce and as a rule of thumb 
the poorer spouse would receive one third of the joint income and assets. 
This approach has been subsequently discredited in English law and is hardly 
followed. 
Kriegler J in Beaumont a quo, having rejected the argument that a universal 
partnership existed between the spouses, adopted the one third rule. He did 
so with caution, bearing in mind the difference between the English and South 
African Acts in relation to the single enquiry in English law as to asset and 
maintenance payments, and the separate enquiries in South African law on 
those two questions. He concluded: "If therefore, a particular case calls for 
both a redistribution of assets plus an order for maintenance, it would not be 
so inappropriate to take as a starting point in maintenance cum redistribution 
cases the traditional one third that our Courts have used as a starting point in 
maintenance matters. "r21 Kriegler J does not explain why this particular case 
calls for both the redistribution of assets and an order for maintenance. On 
the contrary his comments suggest that a maintenance order could well have 
been dispensed with by increasing the assets transfer. The evidence showed 
that Mrs Beaumont needed maintenance. It was suggested to the judge by Mr 
Beaumont's counsel that the capital would extinguish the need for 
maintenance. The judge disagreed - he stated that he had specifically borne in 
mind that he would award maintenance when making the redistribution award. 
"Had that not been the case, the proportion to be transferred to the defendant 
may well have been higher" .(3l Nowhere is it suggested that Mr Beaumont 
could not afford a greater capital transfer. On the contrary, the judge 
commented that Mr Beaumont will remain a man of substance and bring in 
good income. In my view, the case reveals that even if his capital base was 
depleted, he would have been able to recoup his loss. Yet the Judge did not 
consider a clean break. 
(1) [1973] 1 ALL ER 829 (CA). 
(2) At180C-D. 
(3) At 184 D. 
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It is interesting to observe why he felt the one third rule was appropriate in 
regard to assets. He felt that the wife could buy and furnish a house and the 
husband would not be crippled by making payment therefor. Here he looked 
at the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay, neither of which are 
factors under s 7(3), although are clearly allied to "existing means and 
obligations". Need, on the one hand, and affordability, on the other, are more 
in line with an enquiry to apply a clean break between the parties ie. looking 
forward not backwards. Kriegler J did not take that line of thinking any 
further. He seemed determined to award maintenance in addition to assets. 
Having begun with one third as a "starting point" for the asset redistribution 
order, he moved no further and ended up at his starting point. Thus he was 
obliged to call upon the maintenance provisions to supplement the shortfall. It 
seems that a misconstrued reliance on the one third rule prevented a clean 
break from being applied. There was no logical reason to have resorted to the 
one third rule. In fact, as stated above, the judge's own comments suggest 
the opposite. 
A case which followed soon after Beaumont a quo also relied on the one third 
rule. In MacGregor v MacGregor,11i Nel J did not even give consideration to a 
clean break when the facts and circumstances were suitable for such an order. 
The parties were married for 1 5 years, both worked during the marriage, the 
wife on a half-day basis. During the marriage, through the combined efforts 
and financial resources of both parties, they had bought, renovated and sold at 
a profit several houses. At the time of divorce, the property which had been 
bought was registered in the wife's name. The other assets were the wife's 
monetary investment, the husband's pension fund and savings. Nel J 
recognised that the husband would be able to build up further assets before 
retirement age (being 49 years at the date of the divorce, relatively well paid 
and in secure employment). The wife's earning capacity on the other hand 
was inferior to the husband's but the judge remarked that she would have to 
take up full-time employment. Being obliged to look at the contributions of 
both spouses to the other's estate, he simply adopted the Wachtel ruling for 
no apparent reason without comment on its applicability. He seemed to 
accept it as a fixed rule. 
(1) 1986 (3) SA 644 (C). 
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But then in doing so, he took away from the wife an interest-bearing 
investment which would no doubt have supplemented her income, and ordered 
her husband to pay her maintenance of R300 per month. Had the clean break 
been a dominant principle, the wife could have retained the majority of the 
assets and the husband could have retained some but gone on to acquire 
some more by virtue of his well paid employment and there would have been 
no further residual ties between the parties. Again an ill founded reliance on 
the one third rule left an ongoing and unnecessary relationship between two 
divorced parties. 
The suitability of the one third rule was put to rest by the Appellate Division in 
the Beaumont matter. The Appellate Division appears to have accepted the 
argument that Wachtel was decided prior to the amendment of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and was accordingly not appropriate even in 
English law. The judge noted that the one third rule created more problems 
than it resolved and that it was not accepted as part of our law. Having 
discarded the one third rule, and no longer feeling bound to an arbitrary rule, 
one would have expected the courts to take a bolder approach in redistributing 
assets, this has not been the result. 
Universal Partnership 
Another principle which has taken up judicial deliberation in the discussion of 
an equitable basis on which to divide marital assets has been that of a 
universal partnership. In theory, this principle well founds a clean break. In 
practice the principle has not met with judicial approval. 
In Beaumont a quo, it was put forward on behalf of Mrs Beaumont that she 
and her husband were in a universal partnership and she was thus entitled to 
division of the assets on an equal basis. Judge Kriegler's response was that "/ 
am not dealing with the assessment of partnership shares . . . The nature of the 
current exercise is fundamentally different. "m 
(1) At179D. 
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He rejected the analogy with the Muhlmann 111 case in relation to universal 
partnership on the basis of differing enquiries and also differing facts in 
relation to each solution. The Beaumonts commenced their marriage with no 
assets whereas Mrs Muhlmann entered an existing partnership and her claim 
was based on what she should be awarded as a partner. He concluded that 
the relative means and obligations of the Muhlmanns were irrelevant 121 
(whereas those of the Beaumonts were relevant). Taking that argument 
further, one wonders how the judge would have applied that logic had Mrs 
Beaumont not impressed him as she did with her contributions to Mr 
Beaumont's estate within the mandatory guidelines which he had identified. 
Had she failed to qualify factually in terms of the wording of s 7(3), the 
relative means and obligations of the Beaumonts would have been irrelevant 
too in the context of a transfer of assets. Thus no asset transfer and certainly 
no clean break would have been possible. Only large and long-term 
maintenance payments would have been the answer. 
The existence of a universal partnership is an argument put up in many cases 
dealing with s 7 and has been rejected almost uniformally with the exception 
of the a quo judgments in Kritzinger v Kritzinger 131 and Katz v Katz 141 where it 
was accepted and applied. In Kritzinger a quo Berman J found that the parties 
were married de facto in community of property and in Katz a quo a universal 
partnership was found to exist. On appeal of both cases, the argument was 
rejected. The rejections were based largely on the reasoning that the criteria 
and enquiry in terms of s 7(3) were fundamentally different from partnership 
dissolution enquiries. In the latter case, monetary contributions are 
paramount, whereas with marriages there are very many more issues to be 
considered which have no place in relation to partnerships. However, in my 
view, if the clean break is ever to have a proper place within our law, one 
needs to view the marriage institution within the very broad framework of a 
partnership as an underlying philosophical basis. That is not to say that all 
( 1 l Muhlmann v Muhlmann 1984 (3) SA 102 (A). 
(2) At 179 E. 
(3) 1987 4 (SA) 85 (C). 
(4) Unreported WLD decision. 
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marriages should be treated as if they were in community of property, nor that 
all partnerships are equal, but that the fundamental entitlement of each party 
is established at the outset and the division of the assets would then be based 
on which party had the greater rights thereto. Those rights would include 
need and future ability to survive financially. Thereby, in appropriate 
situations, a clean break would result. 
The case of Van Gysen v Van Gysen 11i is worth mentioning for a particular 
passage of Tebbutt J in which he commented on the underlying philosophy of 
s7(3): " ... where assets in the marriage have been acquired and maintained by 
the joint efforts of both, then when the marriage breaks down they should be 
regarded as the joint property of both of them, no matter in whose name they 
stand and a distribution of those assets can be effected by the Court if the 
parties cannot agree to do so themselves. "12i 
This comment is significant for it predicates as a basis for the entitlement of 
both parties to the assets (notwithstanding legal ownership), their joint efforts. 
The judge has moved away from the maintenance or increase of the other's 
estate to contributing in general to the amassing of assets. That he regards as 
the underlying philosophy of both the English and South African Acts. Indeed, 
were this statement to be carried to its logical conclusion, a clean break would 
certainly be a more frequent consequence. Notwithstanding his own dicta, 
Tebbutt J ruled that each party retain his/her own assets, which in effect 
resulted in a one-third/two-third division. The cases that followed have not 
taken so bold a view on commenting on joint efforts and ownership. It seems 
clear that the courts will not accept a marriage per se as a universal 
partnership and something more than the marital relationship will have to be 
proven for this argument to succeed. 
(1) 1986(1)SA56(C). 
(2) At 64 H - I. 
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Misconduct 
An encouraging observation can be made in relation to the court's treatment 
of misconduct. Both courts in the Beaumont decisions placed misconduct in 
its proper perspective. Although it was felt that notwithstanding the absence 
of misconduct as a consideration under s 7(3), it could be taken into account 
even when no maintenance order was made, under the head of 'any other 
factor'. However, Botha JA in the appellate division !1l expressed his 
conviction that our courts would adopt a conservative approach in assessing a 
party's misconduct as a relevant factor, whether under s 7(2) or s 7(3). 
Misconduct, when gross, needed to be placed in the melting pot of factors 
and should not be accorded a specific quantification in terms of asset 
distribution.!21 The view of the judges in Beaumont is, in my opinion, correct. 
Taking that view against a backdrop of applying a clean break, it could 
conceivably come about that misconduct too heavily weighted could prevent a 
clean break from being put into effect by reducing the asset transfer and thus 
requiring a maintenance order to supplement the insufficiency, or alternatively 
it could increase the asset transfer, making a maintenance order unnecessary. 
Botha JA looked at Mr Beaumont's conduct in the context of Mrs Beaumont's 
maintenance needs. The uncertainty as to her employment possibility tipped 
the scales in her favour in relation to the quantum of maintenance. 
The Kritzinger judgments on the other hand are unfortunate for the very way 
in which the concept of misconduct is dealt with. Berman J a quo laid great 
emphasis on the misconduct of Mrs Kritzinger and the Appellate Division 
attempted in an over-conscious way to redress the over-emphasis a quo. The 
result is a focus on misconduct, and the final awards were influenced by that. 
It can be argued that s 9 of the Divorce Act can assist in effecting a clean 
break. S 9 allows the court to order a forfeiture of the benefits of a marriage 
by one party in favour of another based on the forfeiting party's conduct in 
relation to the break down of the marriage. As stated above the application of 
s 9 may well put the court in a position to effect a clean break if the award is 
(1) At994E. 
(2) Compare with Kritzinger and Archer discussed below. 
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sufficiently large to obviate the necessity of maintenance, or may require a 
maintenance award if the asset transfer is reduced. However, in my view, it 
would be a mistake to rely on s 9 as a tool to effect a clean break. The issues 
and enquiries revolving around s 9 are altogether different from those related 
to s 7. S 9 is a punitive provision and its purpose is clear. The underlying 
philosophy of the clean break is not to punish either party but to make them 
financially independent. The purpose of S 9 is to penalise. Reliance on s 9 to 
effect a clean break will result in a greater magnification of the parties' 
conduct, a regressive step in my view. 
The nature of the contribution 
There has been great judicial debate as to what constitutes a 'contribution' 
within the meaning of s 7. The approach of the courts is varied. Both 
Beaumont judgments took an overall view of the contributions made by both 
parties. The court did not consider each party's claim separately and 
thereafter set one off against the other. Also Botha JA in the Appellate 
Division did not even attempt to quantify the saving that Mrs Beaumont had 
effected to her husband's estate. Suffice it was for him to say that it was 
substantial. Had he looked at rands and cents the result may well have been 
different.(11 
The court tried to take as wide a view as possible as to what constituted a 
'contribution' within the meaning of s 7(3). Whilst recognising it had to rule 
within the parameters of the wording, the court put paid to the argument that 
a contribution had to be over and above the common law duty of support 
which exists between spouses. To hold otherwise would in my opinion, 
involve dissecting and minimising a spouse's contribution thereby reducing the 
assets to be transferred and invariably thereby reducing the possibility of 
applying a clean break. 
Also, viewed against the desirability of applying a clean break, exact 
quantification or refunds would be a regressive step. The second Appellate 
Division case to deal with s 7 was Kritzinqer v Kritzinger.(21 
( 1) Compare this approach to Kritzinger discussed below, as well as Kretschmer. 
(2) 1989(1)SA67(A). 
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Certain of the pronouncements in that case are in my view regressive if one is 
restriving to implement a clean break. 
The Appellate Division rejected the court a quo's 'globular approach' in dealing 
with the claim and counterclaim under s 7(3) which Mr and Mrs Kritzinger had 
respectively instituted against the other. This is in conflict with both 
Beaumont judgments which took an 'overall view' .(1l The Appellate Division 
required the claim and counterclaim to be dealt with separately. Behind that 
requirement lies the notion that the parties need prove their precise 
entitlements in law. This should not be so in the context of s 7(3) which 
involves a discretionary ruling. Matters of this nature cannot be dealt with in a 
formalistic fashion if justice is ultimately to be done between the parties. Even 
more so, if the court is to achieve a clean break between the parties in suitable 
circumstances, it will not be able to exercise its discretion to achieve that goal 
if it is bound by artificial accounting constraints. To examine one claim in 
isolation, and then the other is to adopt the mathematical approach previously 
rejected. 
A restrictive interpretation was placed on the meaning of 'contribution'. It had 
to be a positive act - putting something into the maintenance or income of the 
other's estate "by way of money, labour or skill". It does not envisage a mere 
refraining from a particular activity or course of conduct. Milne, JA said: 
"It seems to me that it is prerequisite to a successful claim under this subsection that the 
claimant must show, on a balance of probabilities, that the conduct relied upon as a 
contribution in fact caused the alleged maintenance or increase of the other spouse's 
estate . . . The conduct must be the causa causans, and not merely the cause sine qua 
non of the alleged maintenance or increase . . . The respondent contributed nothing in the 
form of money, property, work, time or skill - or, indeed, any form of activity, 
whatsoever, to the increase of the appellant's estate. 11 (2) 
( 1) See comments previously made. 
(2) At 88 G - H. 
Page 32 
This is an unfortunate development. By placing so narrow a meaning on 
'contribution', the burden of proving a connection between the one spouse's 
activities and the increase or maintenance in the other's estate becomes even 
more difficult. The result is that fewer assets will then be redistributed under 
s 7(3) and the chances of a clean break in any given situation become more 
remote. In my view, career opportunity costs are and should be valid 
considerations as 'contributions' as should other intangible and (strictly) 
unmeasurable contributions. To have borrowed from delict as an analogy is 
unfortunate. There compensation for a wrongful deed is the underlying 
rationale, which is not the case under s 7(3). 
Milne JA has also required a provable causation link between the contribution 
and the increase or maintenance of the other's estate. That is another 
obstacle to an ultimate aim of a clean break as the onus becomes extremely 
difficult on the spouse requiring the transfer of assets. 
As stated above, the Appellate Division in Kritzinger said that court was wrong 
to take a globular view of the parties' respective claims but should have dealt 
with each spouse's claim separately. The latter approach was adopted by the 
court in Kretschmer v Kretschmer (1) where Flemming J examined each party's 
claim in great detail (with a fair amount of supposition when accuracy was not 
possible) to reconstruct the sources and fates of the parties' finances over 12 
years of marriage. In this case the court looked at monetary aspects only and 
gave an even narrower meaning to the understanding of 'contribution'. The 
court ruled that the wife's transporting of the children, supervising the nanny 
etc. was not a contribution to the maintenance or increase of the husband's 
estate as nobody would have been hired to do those tasks and accordingly she 
had not saved expenses by the rendering of services.(2) This is specifically the 
approach the Appellate Division in Beaumont did not adopt. But the court 
went further: 
(1) 1989 (1) SA 566 (W). 
(2) At 577 - 578. 
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"There is no justification for reasoning that, simply because specific behaviour would 
have cost money if performed by an outside party, monetary value should be placed 
thereon for the purposes of s 7(3). 11 (1) Further it is stated: "The point is that not 
every activity which can notionally be obtained as a paid-for service can be claimed to 
represent something by which a party contributed to maintenance or increase in net 
estate." (2) And also: "Section 7(3) is not an action for damages suffered as a result 
of a lost opportunity to build up an own estate."(31 One would agree with the judge 
that compensation is not necessary, but it is reasonable to regard 'sacrifice' of 
this nature as a contribution. Nor did the court regard it as a saving of 
expenses by the husband that the wife contributed to her own maintenance. 
The judge concluded that the husband's estate increased despite the wife's 
free spending {and his own). The husband's estate of approximately R1 ,4 
million was made up largely from his family assets and only R81 000 was built 
up by his own efforts to which the wife was said to have directly contributed 
nought. Her estate was put as a negative amount. The wife was awarded 
R33 000 which was the actual amount which she had borne as a loss as a 
result of increased income tax payable by her arising from her husband's large 
income. The husband was also ordered to pay R20 000 as a premium 
towards an endowment policy or retirement annuity for the wife "as 
maintenance to plaintiff on a 'clean break' basis. 11 (4) While one commends the 
court for breaking the ties between the parties and employing a clean break 
policy, the general tenor of the judgment militates against a clean break in 
other circumstances as the application of its principles {in relation to 
contributions) invites smaller s 7(3) orders and therefore maintenance orders 
will be needed to avoid undue hardship. In this case the husband was wealthy 
enough for the wife not to have to work nor to have to contribute to his 
estate. On divorce she thus had a very small claim under s 7(3), whereas the 
husband retained his wealth. The court placed much significance on the fact 
that most of the husband's wealth was from his family.(51 
(1) At580H. 
(2) At 581 C. 
(3) At 580 G. 
(4) At 584 E. 
(5) This issue is discussed later in relation to Beira and Smith. 
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The line of Kretschmer was not adopted in the Appellate Division decision of 
Katz v Katz 111 where again substantial wealth was involved. The facts of this 
case fitted "the circumstances" suitable to a clean break which Beaumont (a 
quo) spoke of. Here were a wealthy husband, an attorney who had made 
good in property investments and a wife who was a housewife in the 
traditional sense save for minor forays into the job market. In the court a quo 
she was granted a redistribution order of R3,5 million on the grounds of the 
existence of a universal partnership. The tender in the court a quo by the 
husband had been R2 000 per month for the wife plus R300 000 by way of a 
redistribution. The tender was later amended to delete the maintenance offer 
and increase the asset transfer to R750 000. At the trial, the husband's 
assets totalled R7,5 million and the wife's R304 000. The court gave its view 
of the clean break principle. "When a Court makes an order for maintenance in 
terms of s 7(2) it may have regard to the factors there set out, including 'an order in 
terms of ss (3) and any other factor which in the opinion of the Court should be taken 
into account. ' There is nothing in ss (5) which specifically provides that in the 
determination of the assets to be transferred as contemplated in ss (3), regard may be 
had to the fact that no order is being made in terms of ss (2). Nevertheless, such regard 
is not excluded . . . In terms of the decision in Beaumonts' case supra, the 'clean break' 
concept is not foreign to our law. It is obvious that a 'complete termination of the 
financial dependence of one party on the other' cannot be achieved so long as there is 
to be an order for the periodical payment of maintenance. It follows that it will 
frequently (one may almost say generally) be necessary, if a clean break is to be 
achieved, that the amount of the determination should be at least such that the spouse 
concerned will be in a financial position to maintain herself or himself. In such 
circumstances, a Court will ordinarily take into account the spouse 's maintenance 
needs. "121 
The court examined in some detail the contributions of Mrs Katz to the 
maintenance of her husband's estate, dividing them into three broad 
categories. The first category, being contributions from her parents, was 
discounted in terms of s 7(3). The second category, being her contributions to 
the matrimonial homes, was not significant. The third category, being her 
'services' as a wife and mother, was rendered with the assistance of three 
domestic employees. It was the latter category upon which the wife factually 
(1) 1989 (3) SA 1 (A). 
(2) At 11 A - D. 
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had to rely to evaluate her contributions. The court found "evaluation of the 
wife's 'services' ... a difficult task"111 Taking all factors into consideration, her 
contributions can by no means be seen as substantial. On the contrary, the 
court remarked that: "There is no doubt that it was, to an overwhelming degree, the 
appellant's own energy, ability, knowledge and courage that enabled him to make 
extremely profitable investments in property, and even more profitable investments in the 
stock market." 121 And further: "The respondent played no role in the decisions to 
acquire any assets which constituted the appellant's property portfolio, and later his 
share portfolio."131 
Yet the court saw fit to award her R1 ,5 million. Why? It is interesting to 
examine some remarks. After discussing the clean break principle, the judge 
stated that the trial court found: " ... the amount needed to maintain the respondent 
would be in the vicinity of R500 000 ... "141 Maintain here meant buying her a house, 
a car and an annuity to provide her with a gross monthly income of R6 000. 
On appeal, the judge stated that the above finding was unrealistic as it failed 
to take inflation into account and the tax she would have had to pay on the 
annuity income. 
Whilst the court was at great pains to state that the judgment did not lay 
down general principles but related to this particular case, its reasoning did 
break away from previous cases. It was stated in terms that: " ... it would be 
just and equitable to make a redistribution order which would, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, enable the respondent to maintain the same standard of living as the parties 
enjoyed when the marriage broke up. "151 
"This order is intended, again so far as is practicable, to give the respondent financial 
security for the rest of her life. "161 
( 1) At 15 I. 
(2) At13E-F. 
(3) At 13 J - 14 A. 
(4) At 11 F. 
(5) At 17 A - B. 
(6) At 17 B. 
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Several observations are noteworthy. Firstly, the court is applying a 
maintenance criterion (standard of living) to a redistribution order. Secondly, 
the court is viewing maintenance and redistribution as a single enquiry (much 
along the lines of the English statute). Thirdly, the award granted to the wife 
is in no way indicative of her contributions to the increase of her husband's 
estate. On the facts she barely passed that hurdle, even if contributions were 
given the widest possible meaning, contrary to the decisions mentioned earlier. 
Fourthly, the court looked at the wife's needs, almost exclusively, and made 
an order based on that (subject to the affordability by the husband which was 
not an issue). Fifthly, the value of the husband's estate was irrelevant, so 
long as he could afford to pay enough to provide her with financial security for 
the rest of her life. Sixthly, 'services' do not require monetary evaluation ie it 
need not be proved that if the wife had not performed those tasks somebody 
would have been employed to do them and thus the wife's contribution saved 
expenses. Seventhly, a wife did not have to perform duties over and above 
her common law duties to qualify for a s 7(3) order. 
But perhaps the most important breakthrough in this case, and the firmest 
push for a clean break comes from the court's dicta: 
"Before the Court can make an order in terms of ss (3) it must be established (a) that 
the party seeking such an order has made a contribution; (b) that such a contribution 
has increased or maintained the other party's estate; and (c) that it would be just and 
equitable to make such an order because of (a) and (b). It does not follow that the 
manner in which the Court is to arrive at what is just and equitable is limited to what 
has been contributed. In the first place this is not what the section says. In the second 
place this Court in Beaumont's case supra has held quite clearly that this is not what 
the section means. " ( 1 l 
The comments above are made in the context of rejecting the common law 
duty of support argument, but go much further. They provide a liberal 
interpretation of s 7(3). Whereas the enquiry up to now has been what is just 
and equitable in the light of the contributions, this case, to some extent, 
unlinks the two enquiries. This opens the way to implementing a final 
cessation of ties between the parties - a clean break - based on different 
criteria. 
(1) At15B-D. 
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The court pointed out that the husband's large estate enabled the court to 
take the approach that it did. It also pointed out the anomaly in this - where a 
spouse contributed a great deal, she may not receive a large redistribution or 
any at all because the husband's estate simply cannot accommodate it 
financially.11) That, as the judge says, is unavoidable. 
A similar observation was made by Ludorf J in Archer v Archer.121 The estate 
of the husband was worth approximately R 1 , 5 million at the time of the trial. 
It would, as the judge observed: " ... permit of division into portions being 
economically viable in the sense that such portions would be capable each of providing 
adequately by way of maintenance for the owner of such portion." (3) 
In awarding R300 000 to the wife, the judge was much swayed in my view by 
the heartless way in which the husband had treated the wife during the 
marriage. He accepted as common cause that the wife had contributed to the 
husband's estate in the manner contemplated by the Act but felt it 
unnecessary to elaborate. Thus, whether the contribution was the basis of 
the kind of transfer ordered is not possible to tell from the judgment. 
In Beaumont (a quo}, Kriegler J, in relation to the advantages of a clean break 
stated that they need not be elaborated on. Ludorf J in Archer gives his 
reasons for doing so: 
"Quite apart from the above considerations, it seems to me that in the light of 
appellant's conduct during the marriage, more particularly his attitude towards 
respondent as evidenced by such conduct, and his relationship with the lady with whom 
he is living, it would be desirable to exercise my discretion so as to bring about a 'clean 
break' between the parties and to render the respondent financially independent from the 
appellant. 11(4) 
(1) At17C-D. 
(2) 1989 (2) SA 885 (E). 
(3) At 894 G. 
(4) At 894 J - 895 A. 
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The financial independence seems to come as an afterthought. There was no 
great delving into her economic viability after the divorce. She was awarded 
R300 000 and already possessed R200 000 worth of assets. Although one 
feels that the judgment was overall correct, it is difficult to elicit the principles 
from it. It is not clear how the judge arrived at R300 000 as a redistribution, 
nor on what basis it was made other than it seemed fair and just in the 
circumstances. He quoted Beaumont with approval in regard to the approach 
to be adopted, ie. an overall view and also that the clean break principle 
should be adopted where circumstances permit. 
One welcomes the Archer judgment for its result. However, it lacks clarity on 
which to base further judgments and in that sense cannot be seen as a 
fundamental advancement towards the clean break principle. 
Deprivation of Income Producing Assets 
On the facts, Botha JA in the Beaumont appeal, endorsed Kriegler J's 
conclusion not to order a redistribution only, as this would have meant too 
great a reduction on Mr Beaumont's income producing capital or too small a 
capital payment to Mrs Beaumont to provide for her needs. But commenting 
on Mr Beaumont's failure to take the witness stand to give evidence on his 
income, Botha JA said: "/should add that, if the appellant should have problems in 
complying with the orders of the Court a quo by using only his available income, there 
is no reason why he should not dispose of some of his assets in order to meet his 
obligations, for he can do so without harming his income-producing business. It 
appears from the evidence that the appellant is not using all of the land he has at Brits 
for the purposes of his business; he can sell off whatever he does not need. He can 
also realise his share in the property at Mossel Bay. This will not result in undue 
hardship on him. 11(1) One can only ask why the court did not transfer one or 
more of those assets to Mrs Beaumont either to rent out or to sell and invest 
the proceeds, thereby creating a source of income for herself. Thus, 
notwithstanding both courts' acceptance of the clean break principle, they 
were reluctant to apply it in circumstances which, on balance, were suitable. 
(1) At1001G-H. 
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Had the legislature placed more emphasis on the clean break goal and urged, if 
not directed, the court to attain it, this case could in all probability have turned 
that way. 
In Archer v Archer 111 the judge's observations are worth noting, particularly 
his comments at 894 H - J. When discussing the extent of the husband's 
business and the convenience of being able to separate sectional title units for 
the purposes of redistribution "without affecting the essence or continuance of his 
enterprise, nor its profitability or potential for future profitability", he noted that the 
husband would be able to recover the capital loss.121 He went on to say "one 
is, so to speak, not depriving the journeyman of his lathe but only of some of the fruits 
of his labour which he would be capable of replacing with further, and if needs be, 
intensified labour. (I should, however, not be understood to hold that a Court may not 
so deprive a party.)"131 It is the last remark that invites thought. Would the 
judge, one wonders, have indeed deprived Mr Archer of his lathe when faced 
with the option of implementing a clean break by doing so, or leaving Mr 
Archer with his lathe but compelling him to pay maintenance. In the light of 
the decided cases and the legislation as it now stands, it is likely that a 
maintenance order would have been settled on. 
Property Available for Distribution and for Assessment of Wealth 
There is a further issue which indirectly affects implementation of the clean 
break principle, ie what the courts regard as property available for 
redistribution or property to be included in assessing a party's wealth. 
In Beira v Beira !41 Leveson J felt that assets which a party acquired 
fortuitously "such as an unexpected inheritance from a rich uncle" !51 a donation 
from a third party and such like acquisitions should be excluded from 
consideration for the purpose of a redistribution order. His reasoning was that 
such acquisitions are excluded from the accrual of an estate in a post 
(1) 1989 (2) SA 885 (E). 
(2) At 894 H. 
(3) At 8941. 
(4) 1 990 (3) SA 802 (W). 
(5) At 807 G. 
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November 1984 marriage and thus should also by implication be excluded 
from s 7(3) in the absence of express language providing for their inclusion. 
The only place for consideration of such assets is in assessing the existing 
means and obligations of the parties. 
Thus, following this judgment, where one party has contributed extensively to 
the increase or maintenance of the other's estate, which estate is large as a 
result of an inheritance, the proportion of the non-inherited portion of the 
estate to which the other spouse would be entitled may be too little to give 
her financial independence and hence maintenance would be payable. It is 
submitted that in certain circumstances it may well be appropriate to include 
inherited and such like assets to calculate the quantum of a redistribution. 
The same issue came up in the case of Smith v Smith !1l where the parties had 
agreed not to take into account certain assets owned by one of the parties in 
redistributing their assets. Ludorf J had this to say: 
"Artikel 7 (5)( a) gebied die hof om by die besluit ter uitreiking of andersins . . . . die 
bestaande vermoeens en verpligtinge van die partye in aanmerking te neem. Die effek 
van hierdie bepaling . . . is na my oordeel dat 'n hof hom nie gebonde sal ag aan die 
onderlinge ooreenkoms tussen die partye te dien effekte dat sekere bestaande vermoeens 
nie in aanmerking geneem word nie, want die statuut is gebiedend "!2l 
He goes on to say that he agrees with Leveson J in Beira v Beira that certain 
existing means of the parties (for example an inheritance) are not calculable 
for an order in terms of s 7(3). But that does not mean that the existence and 
value of that inheritance must not be taken into account in deciding to make a 
s 7(3) order against other assets of that estate. He considered it "onbillik" to 
saddle one party with a redistribution order (notwithstanding the other party's 
contribution thereto) where the contributor's existing means included a million 
rand cash inheritance. 
(1) 1994 (2) PH 7 (E). 
(2) Ibid. 
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"Die totale omvang van beide boedels is na my oordeel van besondere, indien nie 
deurslaggewende belang, by die oorweging van die ekonomiese uitvoerbaarheid van 'n 
bevel ingevolge artikel 7(3) en of die besondere geval horn byvoorbeeld leen tot die 
sogenaamde 'skoonbreuk' gedagte." (1l 
In my view Judge Ludorf's is the correct one. 
Maintenance 
As a final leg to analysing the approach of the courts to the clean break 
principle, one needs to look at the various recent judicial pronouncements in 
relation to maintenance. Essentially, it is the notion that one spouse may be 
responsible for maintaining the other after divorce that is the single biggest 
obstacle to implementing a clean break. Behind the concept of maintenance 
rages an on-going debate as to the basis on which maintenance should be 
paid, ie. need, right, compensation or no basis at all. As the subsection now 
stands, most of the factors for consideration in terms of s 7(2) relate to need 
and look to the financial futures of the spouses. 
In general, the courts have almost invariably awarded maintenance to spouses 
as an automatic consequence of divorce. This is understandable prior to the 
enactment of s 7(3) but, as has been discussed above, the trend has not 
varied save for a few instances subsequent to the enactment of s 7(3). There 
has been no unanimity in the court decisions as to when a spouse is entitled 
to rehabilitative maintenance, token maintenance or no maintenance, as will be 
discussed below. 
In Kroon v Kroon,(2J the wife was awarded maintenance not only because of 
her need therefor but also because " ... plaintiff is, in fairness, entitled not only to 
maintenance but to more maintenance than would be awarded to a wife who has merely 
shared a bed and kept house for a few years. 11(3! Here the wife's 'contributions' of 
running the home were regarded as reasons for increased maintenance. 
(1) At page 6. 
(2) 1986 (4) 616 (E). 
(3) At 622 J - 623 A. 
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Baker J discussed the interrelationship of s 7(2) and s 7(3) and stated " ... If 
this court orders the defendant's share of the property to be transferred to plaintiff ... , 
the maintenance which defendant would have had to pay in the absence of a property 
transfer would fall to be reduced. The one balances the other. If assets are transferred 
and are capable of generating maintenance, the actual cash sum of maintenance to be 
paid by defendant may be reduced." ( 1 l 
Baker J quoted the case of Higgo v Higgo !2l in which the entire estate was 
split 50/50 and no maintenance was allowed, thus effecting a clean break, the 
yield from the 50% share of the assets being sufficient to generate all the 
maintenance the wife might need. He then stated the position of our law on 
maintenance. "As far as our law is concerned, the position is that no maintenance 
will be awarded to a woman who can support herself ... ; but in the instant case there is 
no positive evidence that plaintiff can support herself even to a limited extent. Present 
prospects of employment in this country for unqualified women in their middle forties are 
depressing. Hahlo at 364 observes that 'rehabilitative' maintenance may be awarded to 
middle-aged women who have for years devoted themselves full-time to the management 
of the household and the care of the children of the marriage; it is awarded for a 
period sufficient to tide them over while being trained or retrained for a job or a 
profession . . . But that postulates a woman who can be trained or retrained. In the 
present case, the plaintiff's history shows small indication of such an ability."!3) 
With respect to the learned judge, Mrs Kroon at the time was 42 years old and 
could well have, in time, become employable. Rehabilitative maintenance 
seems to have been appropriate in this case, thereby effecting a clean break 
between the parties after two or three years. Rehabilitative maintenance 
bridges the gap between lifelong maintenance and a clean break. Its effect is 
to defer a clean break until a later specified time. 
The next case of importance is Grasso v Grasso.(41 Referring to the passage 
quoted in Kroon about the changing fabric of society in regard to women 
having educational and vocational opportunities and permanent maintenance 
being reserved for women too old to earn a living and unlikely to remarry, 
(1) At630A-B. 
(2) Unreported WLD decision (1983). 
(3) At 632 H - J. 
(4) 1987 (1) SA 48 (C). 
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Berman J had this to say "Now, I am by no means entirely satisfied that what the 
authors of the passage quoted above say with regard to the entitlement of a divorced 
wife, who did not work during her marriage but who devoted herself to the running of 
her home and the raising of her children, to no more than 'rehabilitation maintenance ' 
is at the present time of application in this country or as yet reflects the state of affairs 
here ... There is little, if any, doubt in my mind that, where the divorced husband (and 
particularly one whose misconduct has caused the breakdown of the marriage) can 
easily afford to have his ex-wife not go out to work and where she did not work prior to 
divorce, but devoted herself instead to her home and the upbringing of her children, he 
should be required to see to it that such state of affairs continues - . . . What the authors 
have said in the passage quoted above may well be true of childless couples, or where 
the husband does not earn enough to maintain, after divorce, two separate homes so as 
to permit his former wife . . . to be at home all day - in such cases payment of 
'rehabilitation maintenance ' may, or perforce must, be resorted to, but then of necessity 
and not because it is in the best interests of all concerned. . .. Whatever plaintiff's ability 
to earn her own living or to contribute towards her personal maintenance may be, for 
the foreseeable future this falls to be disregarded, more particularly as all the other 
factors mentioned in s 7 (2) of the Divorce Act 1979 are favourable to plaintiff in her 
claim for maintenance." ( 1) 
The approach Judge Berman adopted was that Mrs Grasso was entitled to 
lifelong maintenance {or until her remarriage). 
Mrs Grasso was 40 years old at the time of divorce and was a qualified 
teacher, although she had hardly used her profession. Despite Mr Grasso's 
substantial wealth, there appeared to be no claim under s 7(3) [unless this 
was not a marriage capable of being adjudicated under s 7(3) which is not 
clear from the judgment] and certainly no mention of a clean break between 
the parties is made in circumstances which, in my view, appeared to have 
been eminently suitable. At very least, no more than rehabilitative 
maintenance should have been ordered for a period until Mrs Grasso had 
retrained and her children were no longer young and dependent. 
(1) At58B-I. 
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Support for the approach of Grasso is found in Pommerel v Pommerel.111 
Mullins J expressed doubt that the dictum in Kroon that a wife who could 
support herself would not be awarded maintenance, was a hard and fast 
principle applicable to all cases. He held that the Kroon view would probably 
be correct only if the ex-wife "is in fact earning sufficient for her support, or in fact 
has such assets that she can support herself from the income therefrom. This is a very 
different matter, however, from the notional employability of the woman concerned"121 
He added that a woman's ability to earn an income does not per se disentitle 
the court from ordering maintenance for her; the question of the 
reasonableness of the woman's decision not to work must be considered in 
the light of many factors, eg. age, health, qualifications, when she was last 
employed, the length of the marriage, standard of living during the marriage, 
having young children. This case shows an inclination to entrench an 
entitlement to maintenance. 
I would submit that were the courts to shift the notions of right and 
compensation to the enquiry under s 7(3), rather than under s 7(2), a clean 
break would much more readily be applied. It is trite that an ex-spouse does 
not have the right to maintenance after divorce. Does she have a right to 
compensation for loss of opportunity in the job market, lack of seniority when 
entering the job market at a later age and such-like considerations? 
Compensation is an unfortunate term, but such factors should, in my view, be 
considered as contributions under s 7(3). As stated before, the courts have 
not agreed. 
Token Maintenance 
A step in the direction towards a clean break was seen in Goza v Qoza.131 In 
this case the wife applied for token maintenance in the amount of R1. It was 
argued on her behalf that she had proved the need for token maintenance inter 
alia: 
(i) on the grounds that her only source of income was from her 
employment and if she was to become ill and unable to work she would 
have no source of income; and 
(1) 1990(1)SA998(E). 
(2) At 1002 C. 
(3) 1989 (4) SA 838 (CkGD). 
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(ii) the effects of inflation would result in her requiring maintenance from 
her husband in the future. 
The court rejected the above arguments and specifically the test laid down in 
Portinho v Portinho (11 where the judge said: "Jn my view it is unsatisfactory for 
the Courts to employ gimmicks to create rights which the Legislature in its wisdom has 
now twice omitted to bring into being... If it is deemed in the public interest that 
divorced parties who upon divorce are both financially independent should for years to 
come be tied together by an unbreakable bond in the form of a contingent right to claim 
maintenance, then the Legislature should intervene. I am not convinced of the wisdom 
thereof 
In my view, the test to be applied is whether on the probabilities maintenance is or will 
be needed. If the answer is positive the considerations set out in s 7 (2) come into play. 
If on the probabilities it is not shown that maintenance is or will be needed no award 
thereof (whatever its size) can be made. A token award where no maintenance is needed 
is therefore not envisaged in the Act. 11(21 
In my view, the judge in Portinho came out in full support of a clea1n break, 
although the judge in Goza interpreted the Portinho judgment to mean token 
maintenance would be permissible. Be that as it may, the judge in Goza said 
"I must therefore with Van Dijkhorst J in Portinho 's case question the wisdom of 
keeping two divorced persons bonded together, possibly for life, by a token maintenance 
order made merely to provide for speculative possibilities. Such an order where no 
future need for maintenance has been proved on a balance of probabilities does not 
seem to me to accord with justice. A divorced spouse capable of self support can be 
expected to make his or her own provisions against the normal risks of life and for 
retirement etc. 11(31 
He felt that: "This approach requires the Court to consider the factors referred to in 
s 7 (2) in order to decide, firstly, whether maintenance is to be paid at all (in other 
words whether a need for maintenance exists) and, if so, by whom to whom; secondly, 
the amount to be paid and thirdly the period for which maintenance is to be paid. This 
(1) 1981 (2) SA 595 (T). 
(2) At 597 F. 
(3) At 843 E - F. 
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approach, which I adopt, will in my view, eliminate the unjust results which may result 
from the approach adopted in Brink's case. 11 (1) 
Brink's case !2l contained the following statement by Milne J: "Having regard to 
the depressing rise in the cost of living, at least in the past ten or twelve years, it does 
not seem unrealistic to say that where a young woman is divorced from her husband and 
both of them are wage earners, or capable of earning a living, there is, at the lowest, a 
very distinct possibility that the wife may, in the future, require maintenance from her 
husband, and that it would be a recognition of the economic history of the Republic and, 
indeed, of the western world over the past ten years to make provision for such a 
contingency. 11(3) 
I respectfully agree with the judge in Goza that Brink could certainly bring 
about unjust results and is undesirable as a concept in any event. 
If one is to distil the general principles from the cases discussed above, 
despite the lack of unanimity in a general direction, one can state that the 
following emerges: 
the courts regard granting of maintenance to spouses as the rule rather 
than the exception; 
where the wife is young or reasonably young, in good health, the 
marriage has not been of long duration and she has worked at least at 
some point during the marriage or is working at the time of divorce, she 
is unlikely to be awarded long-term maintenance and may qualify for 
rehabilitative maintenance; 
different judges have awarded maintenance for different reasons and 
aside from the dicta in Goza, none of the cases discussed above have 
advocated or attempted to apply the clean break principle. 
(1) At842D-E. 
(2) Brink v Brink 1983 (3) SA 217 (0). 
(3) At220G-H. 
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It should perhaps be mentioned that in daily practice, rehabilitative 
maintenance is a frequent aspect of divorce settlement and the trend of 
practitioners, in appropriate situations, is to implement a severing of financial 
ties between the parties as soon as possible after divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislation as it now stands is not conducive to the application of a clean 
break. The wording neither binds nor encourages the courts to apply or 
consider applying a clean break. Whilst acknowledging the desirability of the 
clean break principle, the courts have by and large been conservative in their 
approach, with a few notable exceptions. 
The courts have found difficulty in moving away from the concept of 
ownership of assets as being the single most important criterion in 
redistribution orders. There has been a reluctance to deprive an owner of his 
assets in order to eliminate a maintenance order. Financial independence is 
seen more as a welcome by-product of a redistribution order than as a goal in 
itself. The judges have not considered financial independence as a factor 
falling within their discretion of what is just and equitable. There has been 
much judicial time and debate spent on analysing the component concepts 
which form part of s 7. The analysis is contained with the factual framework 
of the past - what contributions were made, were the spouses (financial) 
partners, did the spouses misbehave. The legal basis of the redistribution 
order has also been examined at length - is the approach globular or not, does 
the one third rule apply, how do sections 7(2) and 7(3) interrelate. None of 
those questions take the issue into a consideration of the future relationship of 
the divorced spouses, which is ultimately the goal of the clean break principle. 
In my view until the legislature shifts its focus from past activities to future 
realities, the current approach of the courts is unlikely to alter significantly. 
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